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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates the effects of several American law firms’ international networks of offices on
the total value of overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&A) by US corporations. Nowadays many
nations can review proposed mergers and US law firms help clients overcome such regulatory
hurdles, effectively greasing the market for corporate control. However, they can also oppose
transactions that are inimical to their clients’ interests. I present evidence that suggests that Baker
& McKenzie—the US law firm with the most overseas offices—has facilitated such transactions,











In recent years there has been considerable interest in the means by which 
groups of market participants interact so as to facilitate various forms of 
international commerce. Particular emphasis has been given in this research 
program to mechanisms to locate potential buyers and sellers and to overcome 
contract enforcement problems (Rauch, 2002; and Rauch and Casella, 
forthcoming). Given the considerable growth in international trade flows since 
1985, especially in the pan-Pacific region where Chinese business groups 
operate extensively, it is perhaps not surprising that research into such 
mechanisms has gathered pace (see, for example, Rauch and Trindade, 2002.)  
 
The late 1990s witnessed a surge in one form of international commerce that has 
received considerably less attention from international economists: a global wave 
of mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
2 What is more, since the 1980s—that is, well 
before the latest M&A wave—leading law firms have been expanding their 
presence outside their home jurisdictions, creating networks of legal 
professionals to advise corporations as they take advantage of the opportunities 
afforded by the current era of international market integration. This paper 
explores whether there is a connection between these two phenomena; that is, 
whether the formation of such global law firms has helped contribute to overseas 
US M&A activity during 1999, one of the boom years in the latest wave of cross-
border M&A. 
 
The causal links between the presence of global legal networks and transactions 
in the international market for corporate assets are potentially different from 
those traditionally emphasized in studies of international trade flows; the latter 
stressing the roles of search costs, asymmetries of information, and contract 
enforcement costs. A feature of transactions in the market for corporate control is 
                                                 
2 See, however, Evenett (2003) for a detailed overview of the composition and scale of this 
international wave of M&A; and an econometric analysis of the impact of such transactions on the 
banking spreads in selected OECD nations.   3
that purchases and sales of firms often involve review by and approval by 
national competition or antitrust authorities. These review processes not only 
erect a potential barrier to M&A transactions but they also create demand for the 
very services of intermediaries—such as law firms and economic 
consultancies—whose actions may influence the outcome of these official 
investigations. 
 
In a multi-country world a merger of two firms may require the approval of many 
national authorities. For example, the merger between Price Waterhouse and 
Coopers and Lybrand, announced on September 17, 1997, required approval in 
the United States, by the European Commission, in Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Switzerland—to name some, and by no means all, of the 
jurisdictions involved (Kolasky, 2000). Law firms with a global imprint can and do 
help clients to obtain clearances from national antitrust authorities for mergers 
and takeovers with international ramifications. Familiarity with both the clients 
needs and with numerous national merger review procedures are the means by 
which global law firms can add grease to the international market for corporate 
assets.  
 
Another feature of merger review procedures is that some jurisdictions appear to 
give rival firms greater opportunities to present evidence against a proposed 
merger than others. It is often claimed that the European Commission’s merger 
review procedure gives opponents to a proposed merger a greater role than in 
comparable U.S. proceedings (Boeder, 2000; Venit and Kolasky, 2000); a point 
that was made with particular force by some in the aftermath of the European 
Commission’s decisions on the proposed Boeing-McDonnell Douglas and 
General Electric-Honeywell mergers. To the extent that this is true, global law 
firms can throw sand into the wheels of this form of international commerce by 
presenting evidence against proposed transactions that are inimical to their   4
clients’ interests.
3 A priori, then, it is unclear whether the existence of global legal 
networks has facilitated or retarded cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
 
A rich dataset of the overseas presence of 100 US law firms in 1997 is employed 
here to examine whether their geographical reach across national borders 
correlates with the pattern of overseas M&A by US corporations in 1999. 
Controlling for the other plausible determinants of international M&A activity 
(such as distance from the United States, national income and corporate tax 
rates of the overseas jurisdiction), I examine whether the presence of six large 
US law firms, which together account for 60 percent of the employment of US 
lawyers in the foreign countries considered in my empirical analysis, have 
contributed to the observed level of overseas M&A activity by US corporations in 
1999. In addition, as merger notification requirements and reviews tend to apply 
more strictly to relatively larger M&A transactions, I examine whether the 
presence of these six US law firms increases the mean size of recorded cross-
border M&A transactions.  
 
The principal finding is that the presence in a country of the US law firm with the 
greatest global footprint (Baker & McKenzie) substantially raises the total value of 
US M&A activity in that jurisdiction. In contrast, the presence in a country of five 
other US law firms with large overseas operations tends to reduce both the total 
value and mean size of M&A transactions in an economy. On net, however, the 
geographical allocation of these six law firms’ offices is such that US M&A activity 
into many non-G7 economies, including several relatively fast growing 
developing economies, is double what would have otherwise occurred. This 
implies that the global presence of at least one major US law firm has brought 
                                                 
3 It is worth pointing out that relatively few mergers are publicly opposed or rejected by national 
competition agencies. Often, officials make their opposition known in the early stages of a merger 
review, so giving the merging parties an opportunity to withdraw their merger. In other cases, 
officials signal their opposition during informal meetings (or “soundings”) before a merger is 
proposed. Both types of official opposition may well be encouraged by the evidence provided by 
legal advisers to rivals to the merging parties. In fact, the number of publicly rejected mergers is a 
fraction of the planned mergers that are not consummated. (How small a fraction, of course, is 
hard to tell.)   5
additional pressure on (in particular publicly traded) firms in developing 
economies to improve their performance. My regression results also imply that 
nations with merger review procedures tend to receive half of the total value of 
US overseas M&A than would have otherwise been the case, suggesting that 
such legal requirements have considerable bite. (This latter finding is itself quite 
interesting given the paucity of academic studies of the quantitative impact of 




This paper is organized as follows. In the next section I summarize the key 
aspects of the boom in global M&A activity in the mid-to-late 1990s, and the 
growth of US law firms’ operations since 1985. In section three, the econometric 
strategy and data employed are described, as are the estimation results. A 
discussion of these findings, with suggestions for future research, are presented 
in section four. 
 
2.  The late 1990s boom in cross-border mergers and acquisitions and 
the international expansion of US law firms 
 
The 1990s saw a ten-fold real increase in the value of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. According to OECD (2001), over a trillion US dollars of corporate 
assets were involved in cross-border M&A in the year 2000. Unlike the surge in 
cross-border M&A in the late 1980s, the latest wave was not confined principally 
to transactions between British and American firms. Continental European, 
Japanese, Korean, Latin American, and South East Asian firms played significant 
roles in what has been termed by some as the first “global” wave of mergers and 
acquisitions (Black, 2000). Figure 1 provides evidence on the extent of US 
outward M&A activity, and shows that US purchases of corporate assets abroad 
trebled in real terms between 1995 and 1999. 
 
                                                 
4 For distinct empirical analysis of the effects of merger review regimes see Evenett (2002).   6
Many factors are said to be responsible for this global wave of M&A. 
Deregulation and privatization (especially in the utilities sectors) are important 
explanations in Europe and in many developing economies (UNCTAD, 2000; 
OECD, 2001). Changes in corporate strategy, which have emphasized both the 
concentration on so-called core competencies and attaining global reach, is a 
contributing factor in manufacturing industries in particular (OECD, 2001). And 
liberalization of foreign direct investment regimes has no doubt played a role in 
facilitating overseas acquisitions of corporate assets, as has the ease with which 
firms were able to raise funds cheaply on stockmarkets in the late 1990s. 
 
These developments have, of course, not gone unnoticed by antitrust officials 
around the world. As Table 1 makes clear, an increasing share of overseas US 
M&A activity involved the acquisition of a majority controlling interest in a foreign 
firm. In fact, in 1999 nearly two thirds of such M&A transactions involved 
acquiring a controlling stake. To the extent that these transactions reduce the 
number of competitors in a given market
5, antitrust officials may be concerned 
about the potential exercise of monopoly power by the remaining firms.
6 This has 
undoubtedly contributed to an increase in the number of nations with active 
programs for merger notification or review. According to an advisory committee 
to the US government on international competition policy matters, by the year 
2000 sixty jurisdictions had some form of mandatory merger notification scheme 
(ICPAC, 2000, Annex 2-C).
7 Such schemes are often complemented by review 
procedures to assess the likely impact on a nation’s markets of a proposed or 
actual transaction. In principle, therefore, a cross-border merger could be 
                                                 
5 One of the ways in which greenfield foreign direct investments and cross-border mergers differ 
is that the former typically increases the number of firms in a given industry in the recipient 
economy which, in turn, can result in lower mark ups of prices over costs. 
6 It would be wrong to assume that all antitrust authorities analyze the economic impact of 
mergers in the same way, as recent disagreements across the North Atlantic between US and 
European antitrust officials can attest (see the contributions in Evenett, Lehmann, and Steil, 
2000).  This further adds to the demand for legal intermediaries and puts at a premium the ability 
to coordinate in a coherent manner merger clearance procedures across many jurisdictions. 
7 The spread of such merger review laws is now so pronounced that one leading U.S. law firm, 
White & Case, prepares an annual compilation of national merger review procedures and 
extensively comments on the latest legal developments in this regard. See White & Case (2001).   7
reviewed by many national antitrust authorities; and depending on the statutes 
governing these authorities’ powers, the latter can reject such a proposed merger 
outright or, as is more common, can demand divestitures or other commitments 
from the parties involved. In some countries, in particular those with federal 
constitutions such as the United States, sub-national antitrust authorities may 
add to the number of reviewing bodies. An interesting question is whether the 
cumulative effect of these reviews is to erect a considerable barrier to 
international mergers and acquisitions, that is, to the international trade in 
corporate assets. 
 
Multi-jurisdictional merger review has considerably expanded the demand for 
legal services on two accounts. First, firms seeking approval for their proposed 
M&A transactions need specialized counsel in (at least) each of the major 
jurisdictions, and need to coordinate their counsel’s responses so that any 
concessions (or agreements reached with antitrust authorities) do not jeopardize 
the commercial viability of the transaction. Second, firms opposed to a rivals’ 
announced plans to merge or acquire assets abroad can hire legal counsel to 
present evidence to antitrust authorities that casts the proposed transaction in a 
poor light.
8 Some antitrust legal practitioners refer to this practice as “forum 
shopping”; the pursuit of jurisdictions that are sympathetic to firms opposed to a 
merger. Again, such practices often need to be coordinated so as to maximize 
the probability that a sufficiently large number of antitrust authorities take steps to 
oppose enough components of a proposed deal that it is eventually abandoned. 
As noted earlier, the receptiveness of antitrust authorities to evidence presented 
by rival firms varies considerably across jurisdictions and may well be greater in 
jurisdictions with nascent or younger merger review procedures. 
 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that there are, in principle, circumstances under which the rivals to two or 
more merging firms would support—rather than oppose—the proposed merger. A merger 
between firms in the same market that does not result in lower marginal costs for the merged firm 
could well benefit rivals as the intensity of competition may well attenuate after the merger.   8
One supply side response to this increased demand for specialist antitrust 
counsel in many jurisdictions has been the formation of M&A practice areas in 
global law firms. Such firms almost always started out serving either the US or 
the British national market. As far as US law firms are concerned, Spar (1997) 
identifies two waves of overseas expansion: 1965-85 and after 1985. The first 
wave saw US law firms follow their multinational clients abroad. For example, 
Shearman & Sterling opened a Paris office in 1967 just as its client Citibank was 
expanding vigorously overseas. Spar argues that: 
“Some of the US firms that went abroad matured past their initial 
clients, building sizeable independent practices in their new found 
locations. Most of them, though, did not, and left their overseas 
posts once their clients’ work was completed.” (Spar, 1997 page 
13) 
 
The second wave was, however, on a larger scale and at the initiative of the law 
firms themselves. For example, Morrison & Forrester, a San Francisco-based US 
law firm, opened a practice in Hong Kong in 1982 without having a single client in 
the region (Spar, 1997). In this wave, supply tended to lead demand, as Spar 
notes 
“Once a few firms established sizeable international practices, they 
achieved a critical mass that made them attractive to multinational 
clients. Rather than asking multinationals to spread their legal 
advising among a number of far flung firms, multinational law firms 
could offer coordinated and consolidated service.” (Spar, 1997 
page 14) 
 
These large global law firms were in place well before the global merger wave 
took off in the late 1990s. By 1989, the 250 largest US law firms had 180 
overseas offices (Spar, 1997). This growth continued through the 1990s. A 
recent analysis revealed that in 1997 the top 100 US law firms had 363 overseas 
offices employing 4214 lawyers (Beaverstock, Smith, and Taylor, 2000). One firm   9
alone, Baker & McKenzie, had 1802 of these lawyers on its payroll and operated 




While accepting the argument that the overseas offices of US law firms have 
been established to supply a wide range of services, meeting the expected future 
needs of clients for advice on mergers and acquisitions has been a prominent 
rationale for overseas expansion. For example, the law firms of Coudert 
Brothers; Shearman & Sterling; Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue; Kaye, Scholer, 
Fierman, Hays & Handler; and White & Case are said to have established offices 




I will now summarize some of the main arguments of this section. Global legal 
networks expanded before the latest wave of cross-border M&A. The presence of 
a man-made impediment to trade in corporate assets—merger review 
procedures—provides these networks with a means to hamper or to facilitate 
cross-border M&A, and distinguishes these networks from the existing literature 
on business networks which emphasizes the latters’ role in promoting 
international trade in goods and services. The remainder of this paper is devoted 
to examining whether there is any empirical evidence that the global footprint of 
several leading US law firms facilitated or reduced US overseas M&A activity in 
1999, a year when the latest wave of global M&A was in full swing. 
 
3.  Econometric strategy and data employed 
 
Given that many factors which are unrelated to the presence of legal 
intermediaries can influence the amount of US cross-border M&A in a foreign 
                                                 
9 For an account of the worldwide expansion of Baker & McKenzie see Bauman (1999). 
10 See “Through the Open Door: Top China Outposts,” accessed at 
http://www.law.com/special/professionals/amlaw/global_50/China_chart.html on October 15, 
2001.   10
country, the objective here must be to adequately control for these determinants 
and to examine how much of the remaining variation is associated with the 
presence of global legal networks. The first step taken was to assemble the 
largest possible dataset of economies which received US cross-border M&A in 
1999. Several financial companies track announcements of proposed (and 
completed) US cross-border M&A, and here I used the data reported in the 2000 
Mergerstat Review. This source reports that 52 overseas economies or territories 
received US cross-border M&A in 1999, with a total value of such transactions 
equaling $173.5 billion. Three smaller territories (Bermuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
and Puerto Rico) were excluded from the samples assembled here because they 
were in fact either U.S. territories or where the reported M&A data may well be 
misreported financial transfers (with no corporate assets changing hands.)
11 
 
I have modified the traditional gravity equation approach to estimating the 
determinants of international trade flows to quantify the factors responsible for 
US cross-border M&A in 1999. As cross-border mergers and acquisitions are a 
form of foreign direct investment (FDI), my approach is not too different to the 
many gravity-based studies of FDI flows; see, for example, Levy Yeyati, Stein, 
and Duade (2002). However, as will become clear, I include many more merger-
specific variables in my econometric analysis than are typically found in FDI 
studies. 
 
The gravity equation approach posits that the value of the economic transactions 
between two entities depends on each body’s economic mass and the distance 
between them (Anderson, 1979, Deardorff, 1998, and Evenett and Keller, 2002.) 
In this context, this amounts to assuming that the distance between a foreign 
nation and the United States and the former’s national income are candidate 
                                                 
11 Eliminating these three territories leaves 49 economies in my dataset. The 49 economies are: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong PRC, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.   11
determinants of the total value of US cross-border M&A taking place in that 
nation.
12 The intuition is that a larger foreign market provides, other things being 
equal, greater sales opportunities for US firms and their subsidiaries; and that 
greater distance from the United States makes running a foreign subsidiary or 
acquisition more difficult and so detracts from the desirability of buying or 
merging with that nation’s firms. Data on the 49 economies’ gross domestic 
products was taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-
ROM. Following standard practice, the distance from Washington, D.C., to the 
administrative capital of each economy was used as the proxy for distance from 
the United States. 
 
Three other control variables were employed. The first is a proxy for the retained 
corporate profit rate (that is, the proportion of a firm’s profits that it can expect to 
keep after paying taxes and other government-assessed fees and levies.) 
Economies which have higher retained profit rates are hypothesized to be more 
desirable places to undertake cross-border M&A. I proxy for this rate with one 
minus the maximum corporate tax rate charged in an economy, which too is 
available in the World Development Indicators database. The second control 
variable is the foreign economy’s tariff rate. The logic here is that higher tariffs 
reduce the profitability of exporting to an economy and enhance the 
attractiveness of establishing local subsidiaries. However, an alternative 
hypothesis is that national tariff rates proxy for the degree of policy-induced 
internal and external  distortions to an economy, and to the extent that such 
internal distortions reduce the profitability of firms, this will discourage cross-
border M&A.
13 I took the average tariff rate as the proxy for the restrictiveness of 
a nation’s trade barriers, data which too is available on the World Development 
                                                 
12 Strictly speaking the gravity equation approach suggests that the level of US national income is 
a determinant too of the value of outward US cross-border M&A. However, the fact that my 
dataset contains information on such cross-border M&A transactions for one year (1999) means 
that the level of US national income cannot account for the variation in the value of M&A received 
across different foreign economies. Consequently, I do not include US national income as an 
explanatory variable in my econometric analysis. 
13 In the context of the cross-country growth literature, Xavier Sala-I-Martin has forcefully argued 
that national tariff rates can proxy for both internal and external barriers to economic exchange.   12
Indicators CD-ROM. The final control variable is whether a country has a British 
colonial heritage. This could be important for two reasons. First, in an economy 
with such a heritage English is more likely to be the language of business, 
making it easier for a US firm to run any corporation it acquires in that economy. 
Second, the likelihood that an economy has a common law system is greater if it 
was at some point a British colony—and this is precisely the system that 
operates in the United States and is familiar to US lawyers. Both conjectures 
suggest that having a British colonial heritage will raise the amount of US cross-
border M&A. A dummy variable is introduced to capture this effect (taking the 
value of one if the economy has such a heritage.) 
 
The first antitrust-related variable employed in the empirical analysis is whether 
the foreign economy has a merger notification scheme or merger review 
procedure. As argued in the last section, such schemes and reviews are likely to 
reduce the amount of cross-border M&A, especially for larger transactions. Even 
though merger notification regimes and review procedures vary considerably 
across nations, I employ a dummy variable to indicate whether a nation has such 
a regime or not.
14 The list of economies taken to have such regimes in 1999 was 
assembled from ICPAC (2000, Annex 2-C) and from statements on the web 
pages of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the Competition 
Directorate-General of the European Commission. In our sample of 49 
economies, the following were found not to have some form of merger review 
regime in 1999: Ghana, Pakistan, Egypt, El Salvador, China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Dominican Republic, Singapore, and Hong Kong, PRC. 
 
Before describing the first econometric specification employed it will be helpful to 
introduce the following notation: 
                                                 
14 One conference participant suggested that all of the EU members in my sample should be 
aggregated into a single entity because mergers in these economies can be, in principle, 
reviewed by a single body (the European Commission). While it is the case that these EU 
members are similar in this respect, the values of the control variables (such as distance, retained 
corporate tax rates, and alike) differ markedly across these economies; and such variation is 
helpful in identifying the effect of such control variables on cross-border M&A. It is also the case 
that some of the mergers in EU economies are reviewed by national competition authorities.    13
MAi  Denotes the total value of US cross-border M&A into economy i in 
1999. 
mai  Denotes the mean value of US cross-border M&A into economy i in 
1999. 
GDPi  Denotes the value of gross domestic product of economy i in 1999, 
measured in US dollars. 
DISTi  Denotes the distance of economy i’s capital from the Washington, 
D.C., in kilometers. 
i π   Denotes the retained corporate profit rate in economy i. 
(1+ti)  Denotes one plus economy i’s average tariff rate on imported goods. 
BRITi  Denotes a dummy variable which equals one if economy i has a 
British colonial heritage. 
MNi  Denotes a dummy variable which equals one if economy i has a 
mandatory merger notification regime or a merger review procedure in 
1999. 
ei  Denotes a random error term, assumed to have zero mean and finite 
variance. 
c  Denotes a constant. 
 
The first two specifications estimated were: 
i i i i i i i i e MN BRIT t DIST GDP c MA + + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 ) 1 ln( ln ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( β β β π β β β
i i i i i i i i e MN BRIT t DIST GDP c ma + + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 ) 1 ln( ln ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( β β β π β β β
 
where ln(X) is the natural logarithm of a variable X and  6 1,...,β β  are parameters 
to be estimated. The first specification takes the total value of US cross-border 
M&A as the dependent variable, and the second specification takes the mean 
value of US cross-border M&A as the dependent variable. Concerns about 
heteroskedacity which are common in cross-sectional samples (such as the ones 
analysed here) resulted in a two step estimation procedure being employed. In 
the first step, each specification was estimated using ordinary least squares and 
the absolute value of the regression residuals  i e  were recovered. The latter 
were used to weight each observation and the specifications were re-estimated. 
The full set of parameter estimates and their associated p-values are reported in   14
Table 2 for the regression with the total value of M&A activity as the dependent 
variable, and in Table 3 for the specification where the mean value of M&A 
transactions was the dependent variable. 
 
Examining the third and fourth columns of these two tables it is clear that the 
controls have, by and large, their expected signs. Richer economies that are 
closer to the United States, which have lower corporate tax rates and a British 
colonial heritage, tend to attract more US M&A. The large negative estimated 
parameter on the tariff terms suggests that they are most likely proxying for the 
extent of internal as well as external distortions to an economy and, on net, repel 
US M&A. As these control variables have little bearing on the main question at 
hand, and because their estimated parameters do not vary much across the 
specifications discussed below, I shall not discuss them further. In specification 
1, the presence of a merger notification regime does not appear to influence the 
total value and mean value of US cross-border M&A. I will return to this finding 
later. 
 
To examine the effect of the presence of American legal networks on US cross-
border M&A in 1999, I employed Beaverstock, Smith, and Taylor’s (2000) dataset 
of the location of the overseas offices of the top 100 US law firms for the single 
year 1997. What this remarkably detailed dataset lacks in the intertemporal 
dimension is largely compensated for by its rich cross-sectional variation, which I 
exploit here. Their database indicates that in the 49 economies in my samples 
there were 4066 lawyers working overseas for these law firms. Further analysis 
revealed that 60 percent of those lawyers worked in just six US law firms: 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue; Shearman 
& Sterling; Coudert Brothers; White & Case; and Baker & McKenzie (see Table 
4.) The vast scale of Baker & McKenzie’s overseas operations is apparent—this 
US law firm operated in 30 of the 49 economies in my sample and employed 
1743 lawyers (see Table 4 and Figure 2). For the purposes of exposition I refer to 
these six US law firms as the “Big 6” firms, and the goal of the remaining   15
empirical analysis is to estimate the contribution of the presence of these six 
legal networks within a jurisdiction to the amount of US M&A that takes place in 
that jurisdiction. 
  
It is important to differentiate between the presence of these six law firms and the 
number of lawyers employed by US firms in a foreign economy. Even though the 
object of interest here is the effect of the former, the latter may well provide an 
imperfect indicator of the capacity of US law firms to represent their clients 
interests in an given overseas jurisdiction. In my initial attempt to sort out the 
independent contribution of the Big Six, I proceeded as follows. First, I computed 
the total number of lawyers hired by US firms in each of the 49 economies in my 
samples, and the number of Big Six firms that had over 10 lawyers in any given 
economy. (Requiring that there be 10 or more lawyers hopefully rules our smaller 
overseas offices which are unlikely to have M&A practice areas.
15) Specifications 
2 and 3 in Table 2 and 3 report the parameter estimates when the (natural 
logarithm) of the number of US lawyers and the number of Big Six firms are 
included as independent variables. Consistent with the hypothesis that the effect 
of such lawyers and legal networks on cross-border M&A is only due to the 
presence of merger notification requirements and review procedures, I interact 
these two new independent variables with the dummy variable indicating the 
presence of a merger notification regime (MNi). Including the number of Big Six 
firms causes the estimated parameter on the number of US lawyers to turn 
negative and statistically significant (at the 10 percent level)—suggesting that the 
net effect of having more lawyers employed by US firms in a foreign economy is 
to reduce the sale of that economy’s assets to US corporations. As both tables 
make clear, the number of Big Six firms in an economy does not appear to 
independently influence either the total value or the mean value of US cross-
border M&A.  
 
                                                 
15 I relaxed this requirement to five lawyers and found that it had no substantial effect on the 
estimated results or qualitative findings.   16
One objection to specification 3, which includes both the number of US lawyers 
and Big Six firms as independent variables, is that the former is likely to be larger 
in precisely those economies where the Big Six firms are present. Consequently, 
the independent variable for the number of US lawyers may well be absorbing 
some of the explanatory power of the variable that records the number of Big Six 
firms present. To address this problem, I purged the former variable of any 
variation accounted for by the latter variable, effectively creating an instrument 
for the number of US lawyers in an economy that is, by construction, orthogonal 
to the number of Big Six legal firms present. Specification 4 reports the 
parameter estimates which result from using this instrument. Interestingly, the 
number of American lawyers still has a negative and statistically significant effect 
on the amount of US cross-border M&A received. The number of the Big Six law 
firms in an economy is found to depress the mean value of cross-border M&A but 
not the total value of such M&A—suggesting that these firms are successful in 
blocking larger cross-border M&A transactions (or deterring their announcement 
in the first place.) Another interesting finding in specification 4, is that the 
estimated coefficient for the presence of a merger notification regime turns 
negative (but is not statistically significant at any recognized level.) 
 
Given the difference in scale of Baker & McKenzie’s global network from the 
other members of the Big Six, a question arises as to whether the effect of the 
former’s network differs from those of the other five legal networks that I have 
identified.  One hypothesis of interest is that obtaining clearance for a merger in 
many jurisdictions increases the demand for the services of global law firms with 
a very wide reach, such as Baker & McKenzie. Whereas, attempting to frustrate 
a rival’s plans to merge may only require the services of a global law firm with 
offices in key (larger) jurisdictions, such as the other members of the Big 6.
16 If 
this hypothesis is correct, one might expect to see the presence of Baker & 
McKensie to increase the mean size of the M&A transactions undertaken within a 
jurisdiction by more than the presence of any of the other five legal networks. 
                                                 
16 I thank Kyoji Fukao for succinctly crystallizing the issue is this manner.   17
Moreover, to the extent that the other five legal networks play a substantial role in 
persuading competition authorities to block larger proposed M&A transactions, 
then the mean size of such transactions may well fall.  
 
To investigate this matter further, I have dropped the number of Big Six firms as 
an independent variable, and included a separate dummy variable for the 
presence of a  Baker & McKenzie office in an economy (again with 10 or more 
lawyers) and an independent variable for the number of the other Big Six firms in 
an economy.
17  The results are reported as specification 5 in Tables 2 and 3. 
Interestingly, the inclusion of these terms produces—for the first time—negative 
and statistically significant coefficients for the presence of a merger notification 
scheme. The latter coefficients imply that merger review procedures reduce the 
mean value of US M&A transactions by approximately 50 percent, a sizeable 
economic impact. 
 
The inclusion of these two network terms in specification 5 does suggest that 
these global legal networks significantly affect the extent of US cross-border 
M&A. It appears that having a large Baker & McKenzie office in a country 
substantially boosts the total value of US cross-border M&A in that country, but 
does not increase—at any recognized level of statistical significance—the mean 
value of such M&A transactions. In contrast, the effect of the presence of the 
other Big Six firms reduces the total value and the mean value of cross-border 
M&A undertaken by US corporations in a jurisdiction. The parameter estimates in 
table 2 imply that the presence of each of these other five legal networks is to 
reduce the total value of such M&A by approximately 32 percent. This finding is 
consistent with the explanation that the M&A practices of these five US law firms 
have earned their spurs in part by frustrating the expansion plans of the rivals to 
their US clients. An alternative explanation is that to sustain their large overseas 
                                                 
17 One alternative approach I considered was to include separate dummy variables for the 
presence of each of the Big Six firms. It turns out that there is significant collinearity between the 
dummy variables for the five smaller members of the Big Six, which means the estimated effect 
for each dummy variable would have been identified off at most a handful of countries—a highly 
unsatisfactory basis upon which to make inferences.   18
offices, these law firms have begun to defend local firms against US takeovers. 
My results also imply that the presence of Baker & McKensie’s global network of 
offices has only been to increase the number of small and medium sized cross-
border M&A transactions by US firms. Finally, in unreported results these 
findings appear to be robust to other corrections for heteroskedacity and to 
sample composition (outliers.) 
 
A better sense of the net effect of these six legal networks on US cross-border 
M&A can be found in Table 5. Using the estimated parameters in specification 5, 
and taking account of the appropriate covariances, I recovered the combined 
effect on each economy’s receipt of US cross-border M&A of the presence of all 
six networks. At the 10 percent level (with one tailed tests), I found that all of the 
statistically significant estimates are positive—suggesting that on net these 
networks grease international transactions in corporate assets. What is more, the 
effects are particularly pronounced in non-G7 economies, including developing 
economies such as Brazil, Chile, Hungary, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Venezuela; a reflection of the fact that such nations have Baker & McKenzie 
offices and few (or no) large offices from the other Big Six firms. To the extent 
that such overseas M&A brings pressure on domestic firms in these economies 
to improve performance, then this may well be a positive development.
18 Of 
course, to the extent that such M&A reduces competition in those nations’ 
markets then the effects may not be so benign. 
 
4.  Summary and implications for future research 
 
Much of the existing literature on the effects of networks on trade has 
emphasized the trade-facilitating aspects of network formation. In this paper I 
have considered the effects of global legal networks where a proiri one cannot be 
certain that their presence has greased the wheels of one form of international 
                                                 
18 This finding would also reinforce the case for liberalizing any restrictions on the entry of foreign 
legal firms.   19
commerce, cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The existence of merger 
notification requirements and merger reviews provides a law firm with an 
opportunity to present evidence that might go some way to convincing antitrust 
authorities to oppose (or to demand changes to) a transaction proposed by a 
rival to the law firm’s clients. I have presented evidence to suggest that for five 
US law firms with sizeable global reach this is, on net, exactly the consequence 
of their international presence.  
 
There are a number of important caveats to my analysis which should be borne 
in mind when interpreting the results. First, I am dissatisfied with the use of a 
single dummy variable to estimate the effects of merger review and notification 
procedures. These procedures do differ across economies and may have distinct 
effects. Second, given that not every overseas office (even those with 10 or more 
lawyers) of a US law firm may not be engaged in advising clients on cross-border 
M&A, my measure of each of the Big Six’s global reach could with better data be 
improved upon. Third, the cross-sectional analysis presented does not shed any 
light on how the impact of these global legal networks has changed over time—a 
deficiency that could too be remedied by a substantial investment in data 
collection. One alternative might be to find time-varying instruments for the 
presence of legal networks. Reflection suggests that this may not be as 
straightforward as it might first appear; for example, one candidate instrument—
such as the type of the legal system (common law versus others)—varies a lot 
across countries but little over time. Fourth, although the focus here has been on 
the presence of US law firms abroad, one should be open to the possibility that 
this is correlated with the presence of other service sector firms that facilitate 
cross-border M&A, such as investment banks.
19 Having said this, it is unclear to 
me why the global reach of the latter would be correlated with the M&A-reducing 
effects of the presence of five of the Big 6 law firms studied here. Finally, it is 
worth reiterating that there is no clear mapping from the value of US M&A a 
nation receives and changes in its economic well-being. As discussed at the end 
                                                 
19 I thank Takeo Hoshi for this important observation.   20
of the last section, cross-border M&A can enhance or worsen the allocation of a 
nation’s resources. The goal of this paper was, however, far more modest—to 
examine the positive impact of the presence of six large US legal networks.    21
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Figure 2: The Big 6 law firms dominate overseas activities 


















1990 128 23 57 58 266
1995 254 54 94 81 483
1999 882 48 309 159 1398
1990 48.1 8.6 21.4 21.8 100.0
1995 52.6 11.2 19.5 16.8 100.0




Table 1: Types of U.S. overseas mergers and acquisitions 
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